Road to war | Washington Post
这篇文章是22年8月发的。
When the invasion came, the Ukrainians would need significant new weaponry to defend themselves. Too little could guarantee a Russian victory. But too much might provoke a direct NATO conflict with nuclear-armed Russia.
... the attempt to balance secrecy around intelligence with the need to persuade others of its truth, and the challenge of determining how the world’s most powerful military alliance would help a less-than-perfect democracy on Russia’s border defy an attack without NATO firing a shot.
“在保密和说服他人之间权衡。”
它说美国不给乌克兰提前援助的理由是怕俄罗斯借机生事。的确，战前博弈是很微妙的，任何行动都会落人口实，也有无数解读空间，回头看，动机难以追溯，连当事人都可能说不清楚。
本来打算分成两股南下夹击基辅——一股从东边的Chernihiv接近，另一股从白俄罗斯穿过切尔诺贝利迫近基辅西部。那附近是沼泽地区，但冬天地冻硬了，坦克比较容易穿过。
Spetsnaz特种部队负责暗杀泽连斯基。
The United States and Europe were still struggling through the coronavirus pandemic. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the de facto European leader, was leaving office and handing power to an untested successor. French President Emmanuel Macron was facing a reelection battle against a resurgent right wing, and Britain was suffering from a post-Brexit economic downturn.
全世界在新冠。
法德都在忙于政权交接和改选。这影响了两个国家的判断吗？
可能还有对俄罗斯能源的依赖。
Problem: “How do you underwrite and enforce the rules-based international order” against a country with extraordinary nuclear capability, “without going to World War III?”
No. 1: “Don’t have a kinetic conflict between the U.S. military and NATO with Russia.” No. 2: “Contain war inside the geographical boundaries of Ukraine.” No. 3: “Strengthen and maintain NATO unity.” No. 4: “Empower Ukraine and give them the means to fight.”
这里可以看出和代理人战争概念之间的差别：代理人战争是本来就想发动战争，而按这篇文章的意思，北约的首要动机是防止战争。这种说法更合理吗？
之前由于克里米亚和东顿巴斯冲突，英美和北约其他国家已经在训练乌克兰军队了，但他们也尽量控制支援的规模——还是为了避免被认为在引发争端。
Kuleba和泽连斯基都声称美国人直到入侵前四五天才给出情报细节，但很多美国官员都驳斥这种说法，说他们一直都提供了细节。
事实上的确没分享很多战略信息。
而乌克兰内部全是俄罗斯线人。
直到战争开始后，美国才开始分享俄罗斯军队在乌克兰境内的动态。
French and German officials couldn’t understand why Putin would try to invade and occupy a large country with just the 80,000 to 90,000 troops believed to be massed on the border.
依然是法德的质疑。
只有英国人和波罗的海国家相信了。
这里提到法德依然难忘美英在伊拉克战争期间情报部门出的大丑。以及美国从阿富汗撤军后整个国家迅速落入塔利班之手的事实。
整个NATO分成三派：西欧完全不信普京会发动战争，东欧和东南欧半信半疑，英国和波罗的海国家认为普京很有可能入侵。
Macron and Merkel had been dealing with Putin for years and found it hard to believe he was so irrational as to launch a calamitous war.
“A big part of our focus,” recalled Sullivan, “was basically to say to them, ‘Look, we’ll take the diplomatic track and treat it [as] serious … if you will take the planning for [military] force posture and sanctions seriously.’ ”
美国人说，那行吧，你们可以走外交路线，只要你们也同时认真备战和考虑怎么经济制裁。
Biden responded that Ukraine was unlikely to join NATO any time soon, and that the United States and Russia could come to agreements on other concerns Russia had about the placement of U.S. weapons systems in Europe. In theory, there was room to compromise.
2021/12/7拜登给普京打视频电话，普京说你们的武器离我国家太近了，我现在很紧张。拜登说首先乌克兰短期内不会加入北约，其次你觉得哪些武器部署让你不舒服了，我们可以谈谈。
我想普京大概已读不回。也可能提出了美国满足不了的条件。
后文提到他们提的条件是：NATO停止扩张，并且停止1997以后加入的国家（波兰、罗马尼亚、保加利亚、波罗的海国家）中的活动。
美国说这不可能，但我们可以把边境上的武器挪一挪。俄罗斯说我对你们的态度很失望。
这是美方的试探，想看看俄罗斯到底是不是认真的。他们的结论是俄罗斯只是装着外交一下。
对欧美的条件单纯地不感兴趣。
Kuleba and others in the government believed there would be a war, the Ukrainian foreign minister later said. But until the eve of the invasion, “I could not believe that we would face a war of such scale. The only country in the world that was persistently telling us” with such certainty “that there would be missile strikes was the United States of America. … Every other country was not sharing this analysis and [instead was] saying, yes, war is possible, but it will be rather a localized conflict in the east of Ukraine.”
Kuleba说只有美国反复强调会有导弹袭击，其他国家都对他们说，大概会是一场小冲突吧。
Yermak说如果他们提早5个月就开始恐慌，经济早就崩溃，支持不了后续的反击了。
所以值得思考，泽连斯基是不是采用了破釜沉舟的策略。
美国人在外交之余公开向东欧部署了更多武器和军队，不过承诺不会让军队进入乌克兰。
开始在乌克兰附近、北约东线24小时巡飞。
12月拜登给了乌克兰2亿美元的武器装备。但很多人都说如果俄乌要全面开战，这点远远不够。
美国如此挤牙膏的原因是为了避免和俄罗斯直接冲突。
后来一个美国高级官员说，就算当时给乌克兰更多武器，俄罗斯也会进攻。因为他们根本不考虑别的，铁了心要做这件事。
我很好奇The War Trap会怎么分析俄罗斯的进攻可能性。
Kuleba说，回头来看，"non-provocation"策略完全是错误的。
美国情报机构发现俄罗斯可能会自导自演，先攻击自己，然后说这是乌克兰干的。他们考虑把这部分情报公开。
第一步公开的是俄罗斯在乌克兰边界部署军队的卫星影像。
一月底英国人指控俄罗斯要在基辅建立傀儡政权。二月初美国指控俄罗斯会自导自演拍一部被“乌克兰”攻击的宣传视频。
The initial revelation of satellite pictures could be corroborated by commercial footage, though the analysis was unique to the intelligence community.
我想知道是什么commercial footage。
总体来说美国人知道俄罗斯经常制造假消息，所以他们必须先发制人，提前揭穿俄罗斯要放的假消息。
不过世界各国是否都有动机制造这类假消息呢？还是说在独裁国家发生更频繁？
一月初，Burns在基辅见了泽连斯基，说俄罗斯计划打闪电战，而且美国已经发现他们要在基辅郊区的Hostomel机场开战。而且可能暗杀泽连斯基的团队已经进入了基辅。
即使如此，泽连斯基也拒绝转移政府，他不想造成社会恐慌，因为那样肯定会输。后来事实证明他是对的。
For Zelensky, the decision to keep people in the country, where they could fight to defend their homes, was the key to repelling any invasion.
Similarly, warning Ukrainians to prepare for war as some partners wanted him to, he said, would have weakened the country economically and made it easier for the Russians to capture. “Let people discuss in the future whether it was right or not right,” the Ukrainian leader recalled, “but I definitely know and intuitively — we discussed this every day at the National Security and Defense Council, et cetera — I had the feeling that [the Russians] wanted to prepare us for a soft surrender of the country. And that’s scary.”
说得残酷一点，如我之前推测的一样，泽连斯基可能通过瞒报的方式强行把乌克兰人留在国内，否则乌克兰就全完了。
泽连斯基开始怀疑西欧和美国想要默许俄罗斯在基辅建立傀儡政权，这样就和北约扯平了。他说他怀疑很多人“想要速战速决”。
但他说的这些也可能是马后炮，是戏剧性的包装。可能也只是碰巧押对了赌注。
我倾向于主要是直觉正确，有一些事后美化的成分但没那么多。
22/1/19拜登说他认为俄罗斯会进攻，事到如今覆水难收了，但他也暗示说如果俄罗斯只是搞点小动作，北约可能不会有太大反应。记者问小动作具体是什么意思，拜登说噢那可取决于俄罗斯到底干什么，到那时候NATO前线才会有统一意见。
也就是说现在并没有统一意见。
泽连斯基发推嘲讽：
“We want to remind the great powers that there are no minor incursions and small nations. Just as there are no minor casualties and little grief from the loss of loved ones. I say this as the President of a great power.”
拜登只能回应说只要军队俄罗斯越境，那就是侵略。
白宫认为泽连斯基说这话单纯是为了跳脸，没什么别的实质意义。还有就是为了“protect his own political brand”。我觉得泽连斯基对戏剧性的追求确实是个很大的隐患。但在战争面前也成了优点。
泽连斯基团队说：我跟你开玩笑呢！
他们说如果不把气氛搞轻松点，他们担心美国人对战争的预测会动摇局面。这也是合理的，好不容易把乌克兰人瞒了这么多个月，现在可不能功亏一篑。
22/1/21布林肯在日内瓦见Lavrov，单独问他俄罗斯到底想干什么，是真觉得有军事威胁还是想“统一”乌克兰，Lavrov一言不发开门走了。
22/2/11英国防长Ben Wallace去莫斯科见绍伊古，绍伊古对他说“我们没有打算入侵乌克兰”。Wallace说俄罗斯人对谈判要求显得无动于衷。
22/2/20马克龙还不死心，给普京打电话，问他到底想不想和美国人面对面谈判，给个准话吧。普京说我现在忙着打冰球，我只能说我会和顾问讨论的。马克龙听了还很高兴，觉得他推动了局面：
Macron is heard laughing in delight as he hangs up. The French president and his advisers thought they had a breakthrough. Macron’s diplomatic adviser, Emmanuel Bonne, even danced.
但是第二天普京就发表电视讲话，承认顿巴斯的两个省独立。
泽连斯基参加了慕尼黑的年度安全会议，美国人担心俄罗斯借此开战，不少人怀疑他是借此溜号。
泽连斯基说如果你们真这么关心，就让乌克兰加入北约吧。
“If you discover the plans of somebody to attack a country and the plans appear to be completely bonkers, the chances are that you are going to react rationally and consider that it’s so bonkers, it’s not going to happen,” said Heisbourg, the French security expert.
“The Europeans overrated their understanding of Putin,” he said. “The Americans, I assume … rather than try to put themselves in Putin’s head, decided they were going to act on the basis of the data and not worry about whether it makes any sense or not.”
There had been many reasons to be mystified. U.S. intelligence showed that the Kremlin’s war plans were not making their way down to the battlefield commanders who would have to carry them out. Officers didn’t know their orders. Troops were showing up at the border not understanding they were heading into war. Some U.S. government analysts were bewildered by the lack of communication within the Russian military. Things were so screwy, the analysts thought, Russia’s plans might actually fail. But that remained a distinctly minority view.
欧洲人不相信英美的另一个原因是，普京的计划过于离谱。前线的军队都不知道他们去那里干什么。一旁窃听的美国人都沉默了。
22/2/23晚上：
Sullivan spoke with Yermak, Zelensky’s chief of staff. There was “an extremely high level of agitation” in Kyiv, said a person familiar with the call. “They were not spinning out of control. Just extremely emotional, but in a way you’d expect.”
这段描写很有意思。