A war foretold | The Guardian

A war foretold: how the CIA and MI6 got hold of Putin’s Ukraine plans and why nobody believed them | Ukraine | The Guardian

这篇文章按时间顺序写了各方势力在战前对情报的猜测和反应。和我印象里相差不大，补足了一些不太了解的细节。美英最先得到详细情报，而且随着时间推移，情报越来越完善，几乎能确定普京在备战。法德始终心存侥幸，时任德国联邦情报局局长开战当天还降落到基辅“准备开会”（没开成）。值得思考的是泽连斯基的态度，2022之前他无比坚定认为俄国只是恐吓，现在想来有几分是表演的成分呢？文章末尾说，也许，如果泽连斯基不是最后关头才颁布戒严令，乌克兰就会人心涣散，可能将无法抵抗第一波进攻。万一他是为了最佳戏剧效果，才拒绝承认俄国真有入侵的计划呢？

2025年泽连斯基在白宫的遭遇，和2021年乌克兰防长在美国索要武器支援未果的情况十分相似。美国看似要伸出援手，但实际操作起来处处刁难和偏袒普京。在这种情况下，泽连斯基的“犟脾气”有没有可能是一种最佳策略？战争到了2025年，乌克兰虽然仍处境艰难，但对敌人的孱弱也是心里有数。那么，与其对作壁上观的大国稍作让步、最终一让再让，这个小国表现出一种浑然无惧硬碰硬的态度，是否更加合理？

所以，在2021年，假如乌克兰顺从接受了美国的建议，总统可能将被“劝说”流亡或接受欧美的调停计划（也就是被白送给普京）。或许泽连斯基其实相信普京会进攻乌克兰，但无论相信与否，他都不能表现出相信的样子，否则就会失去主动权？

而现在，他代软弱的欧洲顶住了普京的虚张声势，揭开了全球独裁者的纸糊外壳，这是好事还是坏事？欧美是逃过一劫，还是因侥幸逃过一劫而再次没有从中学到有益的教训？

回头思考法德的态度。对他们来说，预测局势和平是否比预测战争更有利？文章在结尾说欧洲开始反思自己怎么会拒绝相信情报的，但我在调查2003伊拉克战争的时候发现，反省没有任何用，真正推动或阻碍一个行为的好像从来都是最初动机。也就是：这次欧洲自认为“没有我们的事”，“乌克兰有事不是欧洲有事”。

notes

人物

• Avril Haines, Biden’s director of national intelligence
• Richard Moore, the head of Britain’s MI6
• Ben Wallace, the British defence secretary
• Ivan Bakanov, the head of the SBU domestic agency
  • old business partner of Zelenskyy’s and had no intelligence background when appointed in 2019
• Colonel General Sergei Rudskoi, runs the Russian army’s Main Operations Directorate
  • “the best-informed person inside the general staff,” according to a former Russian military insider who knew him personally
• Bob Woodward, veteran journalist, author of book War
• John Foreman, Britain’s defence attache in Russia
  • convened fortnightly meetings of Moscow-based military attaches from Nato countries during the pre-invasion months
• Étienne de Poncins, the French ambassador to Kyiv
• Piotr Krawczyk, the head of Poland’s foreign intelligence service
• Oleksiy Reznikov, Ukraine’s defence minister
• Yevhen Murayev, former Ukrainian MP, rumored post-invasion prime minister
• Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the then army commander-in-chief
  • current ambassador to London
• Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-installed leader of Chechnya
• Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyy's chief of staff and closest confidant
  • spoke often to Dmitry Kozak
• Dmitry Kozak, Putin’s deputy chief of staff
  • had a reputation in Washington as a hardliner, but privately he was horrified by the idea of an invasion, which he only fully realised was in the works on the day of the Kremlin meeting, said a source close to him
  • had known Putin for decades, was the only person in the room brave enough to speak up (on 21 February, 2022)
• Sergei Lavrov, Putin's foreign minister
• Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s longstanding spokesperson
• Sergei Naryshkin, the foreign intelligence chief
  • had information about Ukraine which did not match what everyone else was saying, but is weak and indecisive
• Oleksiy Danilov, the security council chief (Ukraine)
• Bartosz Cichocki, Poland’s ambassador in Ukraine
• Bruno Kahl, the chief of Germany’s BND foreign intelligence service
  • his plane landed in Kyiv, late in the evening on 23 February
  • declined an invitation to join the midnight diplomatic convoy, citing his important meetings the next day
• Kyrylo Budanov, head of HUR
• Denys Kireev, a Ukrainian banker with contacts deep in the Russian elite
  • agreed some months earlier to feed HUR information he picked up from his contacts in Russia
  • The SBU believed that Kireev was a triple agent, ultimately working for Moscow, and he was shot dead as the SBU tried to detain him a few days after the invasion.
• Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine's foreign minister
• Imran Khan, Pakistani prime minister
• Michael Kofman, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington
• Huw Dylan, a historian of intelligence at King’s College London

组织机构

• NSA and GCHQ - the US and British signals intelligence agencies
• SVR and GRU [intelligence agencies]
• HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency

什么是novichok nerve agent？

• 名字意思是newcomer, novice, newbie
• 苏俄在1971-1993之间开发
• developed at the GosNIIOKhT state chemical research institute
• 常温下有固态和液态，可以作为超微粉末、气溶胶、液体或气体使用
• 相关药物：VX，soman，VR
  • A-232 and A-234 are "as toxic as VX, as resistant to treatment as soman, and more difficult to detect and easier to manufacture than VX"
• 在苏俄国内外都有使用过
• 最长保质期可能有50年
• 症状是骨骼肌抽搐，呼吸心脏骤停，就算不死也可能永久损伤神经系统，造成瘫痪等
• 可以用atropine阿托品和galantamine加兰他敏结合治疗

Navalny

Navalny Being Treated In Germany For Suspected Poisoning After Departing Russia : NPR

当时美国是怎么逐步公布情报的？公布了哪些？

原文是这么说的：

Biden ordered his team to share as much intelligence with allies as possible, to help them understand why Washington was so worried. He also suggested a declassification push to get some of the information into the public domain. This had to be done carefully, to avoid exposing how Washington had obtained the evidence. “These are sources and methods that we put our blood and sweat and tears into obtaining, and they can put people’s lives at risk if lost,” said Haines.
A system was implemented whereby officials from different intelligence agencies would have “an opportunity to weigh in on anything before it went out the door”, she said, to make sure nothing slipped through that could give away a source. Over the next weeks, the US downgraded more sensitive intelligence than at any time in recent memory for allies and often for the general public, too. “We were getting classified briefings from the Americans, and then a few hours later you’d read the exact same information in the New York Times,” said one European official.

claude帮我找到了这么几篇：

关于泽连斯基从2021年到2022年初的态度

• 他刚当选的时候想要终结俄乌冲突。到2021年感到和普京已经谈不拢。
• 他怀疑普京只是想在乌克兰散播战争恐慌，造成国内大乱。
• 因此他对美英警告极不耐烦。
• 2022年初，美英认为俄罗斯一定会进攻，法德觉得还可以和普京会谈。
  • 马克龙和朔尔茨还真去了，并自我感觉谈得很成功。
• 有人说Yevhen Murayev是俄罗斯选定的傀儡首相，这让欧洲人越发觉得荒谬。
• 开战当天，泽连斯基对波兰和立陶宛总统说：“这可能是我最后一次活着见到你们了。”

俄国在乌克兰的间谍活动如何开展？

Ivan Bakanov, the head of the SBU domestic agency, recalled that while Russian spy services had traditionally focused on trying to recruit high-level Ukrainian sources, in the year prior to the invasion “they were going after everyone”, including chauffeurs and low-level functionaries. Often, these pitches were “false flag”: the Russian recruiters would pretend to be from one of Ukraine’s own intelligence agencies.
The SBU also tracked clandestine meetings between officers from Russia’s FSB and Ukrainian civil servants or politicians. These meetings often took place in luxury hotels in Turkey or Egypt, where the Ukrainians travelled under the guise of tourism. Russia hoped these people, motivated variously by ideology, ego or money, would act as a fifth column inside Ukraine when the time came.

Russian proxy forces in the Donbas具体是？

美英到底怎么弄到情报的？

• 卫星图像看到军队集结。
• 拦截军事通讯，其中提到大量准备工作。

  • pro-Russian groups doing groundwork in Ukraine that might support military action, and the establishment of a programme to boost the ranks of reservists inside Russia.

• 克林姆林宫线人（Bob Woodward书中提到）。

文章认为绝大部分情报都源自卫星图像和拦截通讯。

为什么欧美首脑和情报部门不相信俄罗斯会发动战争

• The Iraq fiasco in 2003.
• 欧洲情报部门误以为普京很理性（莫斯科认为只有10%的乌克兰人会抵抗，但那也有整整四百万人，俄罗斯军队打不过）。
• 波兰情报部门觉得——
  • 普京应该知道乌克兰会抵抗啊！
  • 白俄罗斯的军队太差劲了，不像是真的要去参战。
• 美国人对乌克兰防长说，俄罗斯绝对要进攻，防长说那好你给我点精良武器吧，美国人很坚定地拒绝了。

2003年伊拉克怎么了？

美英以伊拉克有大规模杀伤性武器为由入侵伊拉克，但战后没有找到任何。

我问claude他们为什么会倾向于认为情报是真，claude说，“布什政府和布莱尔政府在情报评估出炉之前就已经倾向于开战”。追问后它说布什政府的新保守主义派从1990年代开始就想推翻萨达姆从而塑造中东秩序，而布莱尔自称他认为推翻萨达姆是正确的。

为什么法德始终认为不可能有战争？

这是理性的谬误，还是willful thinking？他们这么思考的动机是什么？

chief of staff（幕僚长）是干什么的？谁会被选为幕僚长？

至少在白宫，原本是总统助理。

什么叫rump state？

“残存国家”——一个国家被入侵占领或自己分裂后残余的部分。